The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 is a drastic escalation of an already devastating armed conflict ongoing since 2014. In the words of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, “a new iron curtain” is falling across Europe. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared that, “Peace in our continent has been shattered. We now have war in Europe, on a scale and of a type we thought belonged to history.” President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen condemned the attack, noting how, “Once again, in the centre of Europe, innocent women, men and children are dying or fear for their lives.”
UCL’s Conflict & Change scholars, based in the Department of Political Science, try to make sense of these tragic events, drawing on research they have done in and on Russia and Ukraine, on conflict dynamics, and on foreign policy and international organizations.
Overview:
Vladimir Putin’s military invasion of Ukraine: How did we get here? By Kalina Zhekova.
Not in Russians’ name—Putin’s war is unpopular at home. By Katerina Tertytchnaya.
What do people in Ukraine want? By Kristin M. Bakke.
Ethnicity, political violence in the post-world wars period, and the war in Ukraine. By Manuel Vogt.
From irregular to regular invaders. By Neil Mitchell.
External support and the Ukraine-Russia conflict. By Kit Rickard.
Why is Putin behaving so recklessly to restore Russia’s territorial might? By Luis Schenoni.
What steps can international organizations take? By Inken von Borzyskowski.
How is the United States responding? By Julie Norman.
Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. By Buğra Süsler
Vladimir Putin’s military invasion of Ukraine: How did we get here?
The international community watched in shock the launch of Russia’s direct military invasion of Ukraine. Yet the political possibility for Putin’s radical action—a full-scale attack—already existed. It can be traced back to the 2014-2015 phase of the Ukraine crisis.
Russia’s ‘deniable’ intervention in southeast Ukraine in 2014 was repeatedly criticised by nationalist-conservative parties in the Russian parliament, the State Duma, as insufficient support for the pro-Russia rebels in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Putin did not recognise the results of the independence referendums of the self-proclaimed republics, held in May 2014, and was reluctant to commit to large-scale military intervention. Putin’s moves were seen by nationalists in the State Duma as a rather soft response to an increasingly bloody conflict in Russia’s ‘near abroad’, presenting a significant threat to its own domestic stability. In my research, I have been examining State Duma documents from that time. They show that members of the far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) argued for the need to recognise the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and, as LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky insisted, to establish a ‘no-fly zone’ over the two separatist regions. The need for a military response relied on a prominent threat construction of the West: having triggered the conflict in Ukraine, Western states sought to bring instability closer to Russia’s borders. As Nikolay Kolomeytsev (CPRF) claimed, ‘the Anglo-Saxons will go ahead and implement their algorithms as planned’ hence Russia was obliged to provide ‘substantial material and technical as well as military assistance to the [Ukrainian] south-east’.
Putin embraced the idea of a menacing West, which is an idea that goes at least as far back as 1999 and NATO’s bombing of the former Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war. In his 2014 Address to the Federal Assembly, he asserted that Washington and its allies “would gladly let Russia follow the Yugoslav scenario of disintegration and dismemberment.” Hence Putin’s recent references to NATO as an existential threat to Russia build on a pre-existing and continuously escalating construction of a ‘dangerous West’ targeting the stability of the Russian state. In 2014 Putin did not respond to the conservative-nationalist demands for direct military involvement in Donetsk and Luhansk, resorting to covert measures instead. In contrast, current developments indicate that nationalist ideas have entered the mainstream of Russian decision-making.
Contrary to popular opinion, Putin’s large-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has not been planned in a vacuum. Rather, Putin is mobilising already available policy tools from the radical nationalist repertoire. Notably, Russia’s anti-Westernism is reactive and boosted by pressure from the United States and NATO, which serves to reinforce nationalist ideas with tragic humanitarian consequences for the Ukrainian people. This is a vicious cycle that could have been anticipated.
Not in Russians’ name—Putin’s war is unpopular at home
Sending arms or deploying Russian troops into Ukraine is unpopular. According to the 2021 Russian Election Studies survey, which we fielded in December 2021, just eight percent of Russians thought that Russia should send military forces to fight against Ukrainian government troops there. Only nine percent thought that Russia should train or equip separatist forces with Russian arms.
As military operations began to unfold, Russians publicly expressed their shocks, disbelief, and frustration with the war and with the Russian authorities. On February 24th, journalists and academics signed petitions and open letters against the invasion. Thousands also took to the streets across the country to demonstrate against the war, at great personal cost. According to early estimates, 1831 protesters were arrested on a single day. Protests could intensify as combat deaths on the Russian side increase and the bodies of Russian soldiers return home. At the same time, the invasion is taking place against the background of growing repression in Russia—which could further intensify as events unfold. Indeed, in recent years, Putin has side-lined critical journalists and independent outlets and made it harder for individuals and groups to participate in legally sanctioned protest.
The war and ensuing sanctions have already begun to fuel mass and elite frustration with the regime and could continue to do so in the days and months ahead. For Putin and his regime, the invasion has come with great political risk at home.
What do people in Ukraine want?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine violates the right of the people of Ukraine to live their lives in a sovereign state and independently shape their future. While much focus has been on the geopolitics of this conflict, it is the people in Ukraine who are at the heart of it—and will bear the brunt of war.
Ukrainians do overwhelmingly not want to be part of Russia, but their views towards Russia have been positive for much of their country’s post-Soviet independent history. Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the vast majority felt positively about Russia. These attitudes cooled dramatically with the annexation—and have stayed that way, also due to the war in the Donbas.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to seek closer ties to NATO, though popular support for NATO has been more divided. A survey that my collaborators and I did in December 2019 showed that while 44 percent of Ukrainians supported NATO membership—and more so in the western and central vs. eastern and southern regions—only a quarter would want NATO troops and bases stationed in Ukraine. Support for military cooperation with Russia was much lower, with about a quarter favouring military cooperation but only four percent wanting Russian troops and bases stationed in Ukraine. About half favoured a neutral position, though again with regional variation. The survey also shows that people are quite divided in how they view historical events, for example whether the dissolution of the USSR was a right or wrong step. More recent surveys show that Ukrainians have become more open to an alliance with NATO, with 56 percent in favour in February 2021.
Views are different in the Russian-backed separatist Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics, which are not controlled by the government in Kyiv. A survey we conducted in these territories in 2020 showed that about half of the respondents wanted to join Russia. A separate and more recent survey, from January 2022, in both the government-controlled and separatist-controlled territories in the Donbas, shows that for the majority of this war-weary population who have long suffered, everyday economic concerns are more important than which country they live in.
On February 24th, war came to the rest of Ukraine as well. Ukrainians do not want this war, but surveys results from as recently as February 2022, from the reputable Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), show that they are prepared to resist Russian aggression to defend their independence.
Ethnicity, political violence in the post-world wars period, and the war in Ukraine
By Manuel Vogt
All of a sudden, teaching my terrorism module at UCL in the morning of February 24th felt like a task that was unrelated, and irrelevant, to reality—certainly a very different experience from the past few years when transnational terrorism had become the prime security concern in the minds of many policymakers, politicians, the general public, and students. Interstate war seemed like a thing of the past. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, civil wars—that is, wars within countries—have been the dominant form of political violence since World War II. Yet, while international warfare has been very rare, the number of internationalized civil wars (civil wars with military involvement of foreign governments) has been rising significantly over the past decade. One of these internationalized civil conflicts, which has now developed into an (uneven) international confrontation, was the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In this sense, the current war, along with Russia’s previous annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, constitutes but a new climax of a general trend.
The current war is also representative for another general pattern in post-World Wars political violence. Ethnicity has been a key element in the majority of conflicts in this period. Post-Soviet Ukraine is a typical example of a segmented state divided between the ‘titular’ Ukrainian group and a Russian-speaking minority, which live side by side, yet separately, within the same state. Struggles between such socially and culturally segmented ethno-political groups over access to state power significantly increase the risk of civil violence. This situation is aggravated when ethnic minorities receive support from a powerful ethnic kin state, as in the case of the Russian-speaking separatists in eastern Ukraine, especially where historical border changes (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union) have left these minorities ‘stranded’ in a new state. While rebel groups might be keen to secure military support from abroad, the kin state—in this case, Russia—can exploit the emotional significance of ethnic connections and lost unity as pretexts to pursue its own geopolitical interests.
From irregular to regular invaders
To seize some territory in Ukraine in 2014—and which now provides a pretext for the current invasion—Russia relied on militia groups. While it clearly had no shortage of effective regular forces available, the Russian government’s incentive to delegate the task to irregular armed groups, such as the Vostokh Battalion and the Cossacks was to try to maintain some semblance of deniability. Given the scale of President Putin’s current territorial ambitions, only regular forces could deliver. But in abandoning even the flimsy pretence that militia groups provided, the use of regular troops is also an indicator of the change in his perception of the constraints offered by the international environment and his diminished concern with accountability over these years. Beyond accountability, irregular armed groups are also useful to governments in responding to insurgencies and in repressing the civilian population, as Russia demonstrated in its Chechen war and with its use of the Kadyrovtsy militia, and as governments around the world have shown. Hanging on to power and territory may require a blend of forces: irregular militias complementing the use of regular forces. This does not bode well for civilians, as the presence of militias is useful in forecasting state-led killings of civilians.
External support and the Ukraine-Russia conflict
By Kit Rickard
If the Ukraine-Russia conflict will be fought as an insurgency, and there are good reasons to think it will, research on external support—the often-covert provision of money and weapons to armed groups—can inform us on how the conflict might unfold. If the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan and Russia’s internal conflict in Chechnya are anything to go by, it is likely that regional actors and international rivals will provide military support to Ukrainian forces. Indeed, as stated by UK prime minister Boris Johnson, Russia “must fail and be seen to fail” and lethal military aid to Ukrainian forces could achieve this.
External support in conflict is generally associated with longer conflicts as the number of potential ‘veto players’ increases, and this is especially the case when armed groups receive support in the form of money or guns. External support sometimes leads to relatively cohesive rebellions with armed groups more likely to form alliances when they share external supporters, but there is also evidence that external states can use support to manipulate, divide, or weaken a movement in order to promote their own, sometimes very different, political agendas. In my research, I show that the key factor is not whether the external states provide military support, but the types of support they choose to provide and the extent to which the provision is coordinated by the supporting powers—in the case of Ukraine, this would be Western powers. Unbridled support can fragment the opposition, as was evident in Syria where the Free Syrian Army—recipient of military support from several, often competing, external states—collapsed into thousands of disparate rebel battalions under a banner that existed in name only. However, coordinated external support can help foster a militarily effective Ukrainian resistance, as was the case during the Soviet-Afghan conflict when Pakistan and the US supported the Mujahedin.
While an effective Ukrainian resistance is likely to challenge Russia, create a ‘bleeding wound’, and potentially extract important concessions, perhaps even victory, both scenarios—a fragmented resistance receiving unbridled support or a cohesive force receiving well-orchestrated support—suggest that Europe faces a long, protracted conflict.
Read more by Kit at the WIDERangle blog.
Why is Putin behaving so recklessly to restore Russia’s territorial might?
Russia being a clear autocracy, the unchecked nature of Putin’s power is often proposed as an answer to this question. Yet, for his willingness to take the immense risk of confronting NATO, Putin will share a special place in the pantheon of autocrats, somewhere between Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein.
My recent research suggests part of the answer should be found in the way Putin thinks about lost territory. Prospect theory helps explain the behaviour of autocrats apparently blinded by territorial ambitions. As losing gamblers in a casino feel compelled to take higher and higher risks to recover their bet, these autocrats fail to update their reference point (they think of these territories as their entitlement), interpret military investments as sunk costs, and therefore adopt a systematically risk-prone behaviour to recover them, which seems irrational from an expected utility, long-term strategic standpoint.
Experimental research has proven loss aversion to be a serious cognitive bias deeply embedded in human nature, and strategies have been devised to overcome its potentially destructive consequences—for example, of individuals not accepting that they have lost in the casino. Yet, autocracies like Russia seem to be shielded from debiasing influences, which becomes clear in their permanent inclination to militarize in multiple fronts. Putin is not crazy, but in this sense, he is not acting rational either.
Avoiding a complete diplomatic isolation of Russia and sending unequivocal signals about where the West stands will be key from this psychological standpoint.
What steps can international organizations take?
Many countries are individually responding to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but international organizations (IO) too are considering their options—both how they can punish Putin, with the aim of dissuading him from further action, as well as how they can support Ukraine and other surrounding countries. While many IOs have been swift to act, they are unfortunately stymied on many fronts: UN Security Council action is blocked due to Russia’s veto, NATO and EU military action will likely be limited as Ukraine is not a member of either, and sanctions in various forms from the EU, International Criminal Court, and Council of Europe may not have enough teeth to deter Putin, who has likely already weighed these costs. Still, these same IOs have quickly passed resolutions to provide humanitarian aid, increased military presence in the region and financial support, all of which stand to make a difference as this conflict unfolds.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the main IO responsible for preserving international peace and security. As a collective security organization, the major motivation behind founding the United Nations and the UNSC was preventing World War III. The UNSC has held emergency meetings to pressure Putin to stand down. But the UNSC is unlikely to pass any resolutions in this case, as Russia is one of its five permanent members and, thus, wields veto power over UNSC decisions. Moreover, Russia holds the UNSC presidency this month, further extending Putin’s agenda-setting and bully-pulpit power. History is prescient here: the UNSC did not issue a resolution when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea (in southern Ukraine) in 2014 and the Donbas region (in eastern Ukraine) later that year. Nonetheless, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) will likely gather and may issue a resolution since only a simple majority of voting states are needed for it to pass. Unfortunately, this resolution will lack teeth, as UNGA resolutions are non-binding and it may end up being little more than a condemnation. Still, the UN has quickly released humanitarian aid and stands ready to assist with large flows of expected refugees.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded to provide collective security against the Soviet Union and its mission is to defend any of its member states against armed attacks by outsiders (per its Article 5). It thus seems extremely relevant here. However, Ukraine is not a member state of NATO, so does not qualify for military protection by NATO. Putin has stated that a major reason for the current conflict is that Russia does not want Ukraine to be admitted to NATO, an old dilemma of NATO enlargement. Thus, NATO’s direct actions are limited. Indeed, NATO has repeatedly affirmed that it will not directly engage Russia on Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, NATO has bolstered security among NATO member states which share borders with Ukraine and declared that it will defend every inch of NATO territory. NATO could be activated if any of the bordering member states is attacked, which would provoke the combined military response from 30 countries in North America and Europe. And even though NATO as a body is currently limiting itself to rhetorical shaming, several NATO states are individually providing Ukraine with weapons and financial support.
The European Union is similarly limited in its response. That is because Ukraine is not an EU member, even if Ukraine institutionalized its ambition to join both the EU and NATO in a 2019 update to its constitution. Since the EU does not have its own military troops, economic sanctions are its first line of punishment. The 27-member bloc has issued tough sanctions particularly targeted at the Russian elite, including freezing assets, blocking access to banks, and imposing export controls. EU economic sanctions have been in place before and have not deterred Putin from invasion. Discussions on further sanctions, such as ending Russian access to SWIFT financial transactions have divided member states, particularly with Germany’s heavy reliance on the Russian oil sector. Still, the EU has acted quickly to support Ukraine, sending large emergency financial loans and experts to help fend off further cyber-attacks.
While hamstrung on many accounts, IOs can do more to isolate Putin using diplomatic sanctions. Individual states can impose diplomatic sanctions (for example, withdrawing ambassadors from Moscow), but IO diplomatic sanctions can be important because they are multilateral in nature. Given that IOs create a shared sense of identity and benefits, ostracizing a member state can generate some costs. For example, the Council of Europe (CoE) could suspend Russia’s membership in the organization. The 47-member organization, also founded after World War II, is dedicated to upholding democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and unity in Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) previously suspended Russia’s voting rights in 2014 for its annexation of Crimea. Russia reacted by withholding its financial contributions to the CoE and mounting a readmission campaign; PACE voted to re-admit and restore Russia’s voting rights in 2019. This previous debacle reveals several important points. While Russia was clearly rattled, it ultimately did not change its behavior much. Whether PACE will again suspend Russia—and whether this will matter—is unclear. As we have shown in previous research on IO membership suspensions, Russia could try to leverage its alliances and economic resources to try to negotiate with others in the organization to avoid a suspensions vote. Moreover, one of the downsides of suspending Russia is that Russian citizens will lose access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which provides a rare chance to sue the Russian government for human rights violations against its own citizens (which arguably becomes even more important in times of war). But given that Russia’s compliance with ECtHR rulings is low anyways, that seems a small price to pay. Russia could also be suspended by other international organizations, such as Interpol and financial institutions, as advocated by Garry Kasparov.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) could punish Putin, but there are many hurdles to its involvement. The ICC is tasked with holding individuals accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. After the ICC published a report classifying the Russian annexation of Crimea as an occupation, Russia withdrew from the ICC in 2016. This IO withdrawal was a pre-emptive move by Russia to avoid punishment by the ICC. Ukraine is not an ICC member but it has accepted ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes on its territory since 2013 and the ICC Prosecutor confirmed in 2020 that “criteria for opening investigations into the situation in Ukraine are met” because of “conduct constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity.” That said, ICC proceedings are long, have evidentiary hurdles, and are not an immediate or even medium-term solution to the current crisis.
In sum, this conflict underscores that membership (and non-membership) in international organizations can have real and important ramifications in international peace and security. But it also reminds us of the limitations of IOs including their voting rules, state power, and collective action. Still, despite bureaucratic hurdles, in this time of crisis, IOs have been some of the first entities to step up and anticipate the level of support that Ukraine will need in the near future. And there are still many ways they can continue intervening.
How is the United States responding?
By Julie Norman
The US has been working closely with NATO allies to develop a coordinated response to Russian aggression. On Thursday, US President Joe Biden announced sanctions to impose a ‘severe cost’ on the Russian economy by sanctioning major Russian banks, freezing their assets and effectively cutting them off from foreign transactions, as well as individual sanctions on Russian elites. Other sanctions include blocking Russian import of technology such as semiconductor microchips to degrade aerospace and military sectors. The US and NATO have not yet announced sanctions on oil and gas exports, but Germany has notably suspended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and further sanctions may be forthcoming.
While the US and NATO states are not sending troops to Ukraine, Biden is joining allies in deploying additional troops to eastern NATO states, including Poland, Romania and the Baltics, to affirm their defence capabilities and deter Russia from expanding the conflict further. The US has also sent $650 million worth of military aid to Ukraine over the past year, including a 90 ton shipment in January with Javelin anti-tank missiles and other defensive weaponry. The US is also focusing on the digital realm, declassifying intelligence when possible in attempts to stay ahead of Putin’s disinformation campaigns, and preparing to respond to possible cyberattacks.
The US has been warning for weeks that a Russian invasion was imminent, working with allies to coordinate both diplomacy and deterrence measures. Now that the moment of crisis is here, the administration and NATO will need to shift their tactics but maintain their resolve.
February 27, 2022
Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
By Buğra Süsler
Turkey has called on Russia to stop its unlawful invasion and expressed continuous support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a NATO member that shares a maritime border with Ukraine and Russia, Turkey has offered to mediate, stressing the importance of finding a diplomatic solution.
Ankara has been trying to find a delicate balance between supporting Ukraine and maintaining relations with Russia. Turkey has developed close relations with Ukraine in recent years and sold armed drones which have been used against pro-Russian forces, causing tensions with Moscow. There are reports emerging that these armed drones have been instrumental in bolstering Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian forces.
At the same time, Turkish policy makers know that antagonising Moscow can have high costs. Specifically, Turkey is reliant on Russian energy, and any actions Turkey decides to take against Russia can potentially have consequences for Turkey’s military ability in Syria. Therefore, Turkish policy makers have been trying to choose their words carefully when talking about Russia. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey “cannot give up on either Russia or Ukraine” on February 23rd. Turkey abstained from voting in the Council of Europe meeting on February 25th, about suspending Russia’s membership and highlighted the importance of dialogue with Russia.
Turkey has control over the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea and to the Mediterranean Sea. The Montreux Convention signed in 1936 grants Turkey the right to close the straits in wartime. Shortly after Russia launched its invasion, Ukraine asked Turkey to close the straits to Russian warships. Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted that it would be a significant military support. At the time of writing, on February 27th, Turkish foreign minister signalled that Turkey would “apply the Montreux provisions” but also noted that Russia would still have the right to pass due to a provision in the convention that allows warships to return to their permanent bases in the Black Sea. The remarks of Turkish foreign minister also signal that Ankara is willing to give continuous support for Ukraine.